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Economic activity yields benefits in the form of output and consumption. In addition, there is a non-
material dimension to participating in an innovative economy since much of what is most valued 
about participating in such an economy is the challenge and experience it offers rather than just the 
material goods and services produced. The question addressed in this paper is whether capitalist 
economies are more rewarding in non-material terms than corporatist economies since the latter may 
be less innovative due to the corporatist state’s intervention in the allocation of the factors of 
production and the distribution of income. In particular, we explore whether reported job 
satisfaction tends to be higher in the capitalist economies and lower in the corporatist economies.2 
We will first discuss corporatism as an economic system, then review the literature on job 
satisfaction and take a preliminary look at the statistical relationship between job satisfaction and the 
conventional measures of economic performance; output per capita, labor force participation and 
unemployment, in a sample of 27 countries. We then introduce and discuss different types of 
corporatist institutions. The data analysis starts with a series of scatter plots and tables that report 
statistical relationships between job satisfaction and various institutional variables. We also estimate 
principal components in order to explore the relationship between job satisfaction and institutions 
further. Finally we test for robustness by using data on 47 thousand individuals where we can control 
for individual attributes that may affect job satisfaction in addition to our institutional variables.  
                                                          
1 We thank Arnaldur S. Kristjansson for research assistance. 
2 Phelps (2012) explores the relationship between corporatism and economic performance, including job satisfaction. 
1. Literature 
There is a large literature on the determinants of job satisfaction in the industrial organization and 
psychology literature.3 This literature relates job satisfaction to mental health, absences from work 
and physical ailments (see Locke, 1976) and attributes levels of job satisfaction to aspects of the 
workplace such as physical work conditions and levels and types of supervision. There is also a 
literature, although much smaller, in labor economics made available by large microeconomic data 
sets.4  
Early contributors to the economics literature on job satisfaction were Phelps (1968), Freeman 
(1978) and Borjas (1979). Phelps (1968) describes the relationship between job satisfaction and quit 
behavior. Freeman shows satisfaction to be a major determinant of labor market mobility, in part it is 
argued because it reflects aspects of the work place not captured by standard objective variables. 
Satisfaction is found to be lower among union members, a result confirmed by Borjas who finds that 
the effect of union membership is stronger at higher tenure levels. More recently, Andrew Clark has 
studied job satisfaction in Britain, the characteristics of jobs most likely to make workers satisfied and 
the relationship between age and job satisfaction. 5 Using British data, he finds that males, workers in 
their thirties, the well-educated, those working longer hours and workers in larger establishments 
have lower levels of job satisfaction. Sousa-Poza (2000) analyzes the levels and determinants of job 
satisfaction in a cross-national setting for a group of 21 countries. He finds that job satisfaction is 
quite high in all countries; highest in Denmark and very low in Japan and Russia; job satisfaction has 
fallen in Germany and the United States in the 1990s; and job satisfaction tends to be positively 
correlated with having an interesting job, having good relations with management and negatively 
correlated with having an exhausting job. Hamermesh (2001) finds increased dispersion of job 
                                                          
3
 See, amongst others, Sui and Cooper (1998). 
4
 Such as the International Social Survey Program, the Eurobarometer Surveys and the U.S. General Social Surveys. 
5
 See Clark (1996, 1998) and Clark, Oswald and Ward (1995). 
satisfaction in the U.S. between higher and lower income groups of young workers and also that job 
satisfaction is especially responsive to surprises in the returns to observable skills. Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2004) find that job satisfaction is greater in workplaces where there are no painful or tiring 
positions, where employees control their equipment and their work pace, where they do not have to 
carry heavy loads or work at high speed. Huppert and So (2009) use the European Social survey to 
capture the determinants of flourishing, by which they mean having positive emotions; engagement 
and interest, meaning and purpose, in addition to having self-esteem, optimism, resilience, vitality, 
self-determination and positive relationships. These authors find that higher flourishing is associated 
with higher education and income and that married people are more likely to flourish than those no 
longer married.  
Several stylized facts have been established by this literature using microeconomic data. First, the 
majority of workers in developed countries appear to be satisfied with their jobs. Second, there is 
some indication that job satisfaction has been falling over time in some countries, most notably in 
the United States. Third, job satisfaction is higher among women, the self-employed, the young and 
the old, supervisors and those with secure jobs. It is lower for union members and greater for well 
paid workers. The pattern may be partly explained by the desirability of job security; clearly older 
workers tend to have more job security than the younger ones and supervisors have more job 
security than their underlings. 
2. Job satisfaction and economic performance 
We start by showing the values for mean job satisfaction – taken from Ingelhart (2000) – in a sample 
of 27 countries.6 Figure 1 has the job satisfaction numbers for the 1990 wave of the World Values 
Survey while Figure 2 has both the values from the 1990-1991 and the 1999-2000 waves. The 
                                                          
6
 Countries included were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. 
countries that rank highest in the 1990 survey are Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Iceland, the U.S., 
Sweden, Norway and Canada. The lowest ranking countries are Slovakia, France and the Czech 
Republic. We note from Figure 2 that job satisfaction does not change much between the 1990-91 
wave and 1999-00 wave. However, some changes are noticeable. The numbers rise in Germany, 
France, the Czech Republic and Portugal and fall in Austria, Sweden, Poland and Hungary.  
Figure 3 shows the statistical relationships between job satisfaction, labor market participation, 
unemployment rates and the level of productivity relative to the U.S. level. As expected, there is a 
significant relationship between productivity and job satisfaction (mean of 1990-91 and 1999-00 
surveys), the participation rate and job satisfaction and a negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and job satisfaction. Thus countries that enjoy high productivity, low 
unemployment and high labor market participation also enjoy higher mean levels of reported job 
satisfaction. 
The relationships between measured productivity, job satisfaction, unemployment and labor 
market participation demonstrate that job satisfaction may be important for objectively measured 
economic performance. Judge and Watanabe (1993) study the relationship between job satisfaction 
and life satisfaction.7 They find this relationship to be positive and significant and the two appear to 
mutually influence one another. The cross-sectional results suggest a strong bidirectional relationship 
that is equivalent in magnitude. The longitudinal results, which may be more valid, suggest a 
significant and moderate effect of life satisfaction on job satisfaction over a 5-year period and a 
significant, but relatively weak, effect of job satisfaction on life satisfaction over the same time 
interval.                    
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 Earlier studies found a statistical relationship between life satisfaction and job satisfaction but were inconclusive 
when it came to finding the direction of causation. Thus Tail, Padgett, and Baldwin (1989) and Rain, Lane, 
and Steiner (1991) provided estimates of the relationship between job satisfaction and life satisfaction.   
 
 
                 Figure 1. Job satisfaction in 1990-91  
 
                  Source: Ingelhart (2000).
       Figure 2. Job satisfaction, 1990-1991 (black) and 1999-2000 (grey) 
 
 
                  Source: Ingelhart (2000). 
 
                                         
                                   Figure 3. Job satisfaction and economic performance 
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                                                     Source: Ingelhart (2000) and OECD. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between life satisfaction (WWS) and the job satisfaction variable used 
in this paper (correlation = 0.83). 
 
Figure 4. Job satisfaction and life satisfation 
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5
tur
hun
slk
jappol
slv
greczr
fra
spa
ita ger
por
uk
net
swe
lux
fin
bel
ice
ire
swi
den
can
aus
usa
nor
Job satisfaction
Life
satisfaction
 
We will now turn to explaining the differences that exist between countries in terms of reported job 
satisfaction with various institutional variables, intended to capture the institutions of corporatism 
and capitalism.  
3. Corporatism  
We will classify corporatist institutions into three groups. These may influence the economic culture 
or, alternatively, work through institutions, such as expenditures and subsidies, entitlements and 
regulation. First, we have institutions that intervene in resource allocation. Second, there are institutions 
that intervene in the distribution of income. Third, there are the institutions of neo-corporatism which are 
driven not by the state but by the attempts of the social partners – unions and employers’ 
associations – and other powerful interest group to harness the state’s power to further their 
interests.8  
3.1 Institutions affecting resource allocation 
At the heart of corporatism is an intervention in what the economy produces. This may come about 
through the level and system of taxation, an extensive body of regulation of businesses, barriers to 
entry into selected industries and industrial policy.  
One measure of the effect of government on the allocation of resources is the size of tax 
revenues. Since corporatists care about what is produced they may use the tax system to affect the 
direction of the private sector. Consumption not deemed desirable by the state is heavily taxed as 
well as most income in order to finance subsidies of employment in the private sector, transfers or 
public employment. Examples include regional subsidies and subsidies to selected industries such as 
high-technology industries.  
Another measure is the volume of recorded regulations since corporatists may also intervene by 
regulating private industry. Corporatist economies go beyond the body of good regulation to a large 
body of bad regulation, beyond what is needed to grease the wheels of commerce and innovation by 
providing protection against fraud to investors, workers and savers from unscrupulous companies, 
employers and banks. Corporatist economies use barriers to entry to protect important industries, 
professions and communities in various ways. New industries may be prevented from growing in 
order to protect existing ones. Extensive red tape is a manifestation of attempts to establish controls 
over the formation and operation of businesses in general. There may be permits for the entry and 
operation of businesses, permits for different transactions and licenses for the entry of people into 
different professions. Informal regulation may take the form of the length of time it takes to enforce 
                                                          
8  In labor economics corporatism is used in a narrower sense and interchangeably with the centralization of wage 
bargaining. Many authors – such as Crouch (1985), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Newell and Symons (1987), and Layard et al. 
(2005) – have found centralized labor unions to be conducive to low unemployment. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) detect 
a hump-shaped relationship between unemployment and centralization so that both countries with centralized wage 
bargaining and those with the most decentralized labor markets perform better than those in the middle. 
contracts and tolerance of judicial delays. An aim of red tape may be to prevent one interest group 
from harming another but the net effect may be to stifle efficiency and innovation.  
3.2 Institutions affecting income distribution 
Corporatist doctrine also puts an emphasis on who should benefit in society rather than just what 
should be produced. Retirement pensions, unemployment benefits and subsidized health care are just 
few examples of the state using its powers to redistribute income.  
The size of labor unions and their centralization matters for income distribution. The labor 
market pits large aggregations of workers represented by unions against large aggregations of 
companies, represented by an employer association. What results is what economists tend to call the 
battle of the markups: unions want to raise money wages for a given level of prices and employers 
want to raise prices for a given level of money wages. In equilibrium, unemployment has to be 
sufficiently high to bring union demands in terms of real wages down to what employers are willing 
to offer. Governments frequently intervene in this process through income policies and tri-partite 
agreements.  
The valuation of businesses in stock markets is depressed by the corporatist state. The state 
impinges on property rights by taxing businesses and by empowering workers to acquire a larger 
share of company profits. Labor unions threatening strikes are one clear example of this. Moreover, 
attempts to redistribute output between industries through regulations and red tape that is intended 
to protect one group from another will lower the valuation of businesses.  
3.3 Neo-corporatist institutions 
Neo-corporatism distinguishes itself from classic corporatism in not having the state take the 
initiative in setting the direction of the economy but instead in having the initiative taken by powerful 
business interests. This type of corporatism has several features. 
A weak corporatist state has needs of powerful friends or cronies. The state may therefore 
protect particular industries and businesses, which may smell of cronyism. Industrial policy is aimed 
at the favored industries, not the ones that may turn out to be most profitable or important for the 
national economy. Government contracts may for the same reason be given to friendly companies to 
buy their support for the government in power. In some countries the cronies are primarily relatives 
or long-time friends of the rulers.  
Backdoor deals between politicians and their trusted cronies take the form of businesses’ 
lobbying of legislators, regulators and agencies for legislation or rule-setting. This may over time 
generate volumes of laws, regulations and interpretative rulings aimed at giving various preferences 
to all or most groups and individuals. Businesses may also resort to political contributions or even, in 
the extreme, bribes and other measures intended to reduce the burden brought about by taxation and 
regulation dictated by government officials and excessive wage demands by labor unions. Paying 
politicians and political parties for favors is another symptom of the same phenomenon. 
The proportion of the labor force engaged in the practice of the law may be a good proxy for the 
proportion of income diversion from those who earned it to those receiving various sorts of 
compensation.  
4. Capitalism and job satisfaction 
In order to provide a glance at the relationship between corporatist economic systems and job 
satisfaction we start by using data on job satisfaction taken from the World Values Survey and 
measures of institutions taken from the Heritage Foundation.9 The Heritage freedom variables we take 
to measure the extent of capitalist institutions.10 In Figure 5 we plot the mean job satisfaction score 
for 25 countries against the aggregate measures of economic freedoms.  
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 See http://www.heritage.org/. 
10
 The definition of the variables is found in an appendix. 
                       Figure 5. Job satisfaction and economic freedom 
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We note a strong relationship between job satisfaction and labor freedom; job satisfaction and the 
freedom from corruption,11 job satisfaction and property rights and job satisfaction and the freedom 
to trade. There is no apparent relationship between job satisfaction and fiscal freedom or between 
job satisfaction and the freedom to invest; it is also difficult to decipher a relationship between job 
satisfaction and business freedom due to data clustering.  
In Table 1 we estimate each of the eight relationships. Not surprisingly, we find positive and 
significant relationships for job satisfaction and labor freedom; job satisfaction and the freedom from 
corruption, job satisfaction and property rights; and job satisfaction and the freedom to trade. 
 
Table 1. Job satisfaction and economic freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Least squares with heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient covariance. 
 
In Table 2 we then move on to estimate multivariable regressions while acknowledging the 
limitations of having only twenty seven observations. The coefficient of labor freedom remains 
positive and statistically significant throughout. The same can be said about freedom from corruption 
and property rights. The indices for fiscal freedom and trade freedom have positive coefficients but 
they are less significant than those of the earlier variables. The indices for investment freedom, 
financial freedom and business freedom are insignificant throughout.  
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 This variable is derived primarily from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
 
 
Constant term 
Coefficient of  
Independent variable 
 
Independent variable Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio R-square Obs. 
Labor freedom  6.49 17.17 0.15 2.90 0.26 27 
Freedom from corruption 6.18 24.26 0.18 5.51 0.60 27 
Property rights 5.25 16.87 0.28 7.18 0.64 27 
Fiscal freedom 7.58 16.71 -0.02 0.21 0.00 27 
Trade freedom -0.88 0.53 1.07 5.09 0.41 27 
Investment freedom 6.84 9.38 0.10 0.87 0.02 27 
Financial freedom 7.10 19.63 0.06 0.99 0.03 27 
Business freedom 6.00 6.71 0.20 1.72 0.08 27 
                   Table 2.  Mulivariate regressions (* significant at 5% confidence level) 
 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
     Least squares with heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient covariance. * A higher number denotes more economic freedom. Bold letters indicate significance  
     at 5% confidence level. 
Dependent variable: Job satisfaction, mean of 1990-1991 and 1999-2000 survey responses. 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Constant 
6.49 
(17.17) 
5.70 
(17.90) 
5.26 
(16.71) 
5.06 
(13.82) 
3.27 
(3.44) 
3.26 
(3.33) 
3.36 
(3.24) 
4.92 
(4.30) 
 
Labor freedom*  
0.15 
(2.90) 
0.10 
(2.98) 
0.06 
(2.28) 
0.05 
(2.07) 
0.06 
(1.98) 
0.06 
(1.86) 
0.06 
(1.84) 
0.08 
(2.34) 
 
Freedom from corruption*  
0.16 
(5.94) 
0.08 
(3.69) 
0.09 
(2.56) 
0.07 
(1.91) 
0.07 
(1.87) 
0.07 
(1.97) 
0.08 
(2.53) 
 
Property rights*   
0.17 
(5.19) 
0.15 
(3.25) 
0.14 
(3.09) 
0.13 
(3.00) 
0.14 
(2.96) 
0.17 
(3.14) 
 
Fiscal freedom *    
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.04 
(0.91) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
0.04 
(0.89) 
0.05 
(1.26) 
 
Trade freedom*     
0.27 
(1.80) 
0.27 
(1.71) 
0.25 
(1.69) 
0.11 
(0.76) 
 
Investment freedom*      
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
 
Financial freedom*       
-0.01 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
 
Business freedom*        
-0.12 
(1.41) 
 
Obs. 27 27 26 26 26 26 26 26  
R-square 0.26 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.86  
5. Corporatism and job satisfaction 
In order to provide a glance at the relationship between corporatist economic systems and job 
satisfaction we use data on job satisfaction taken from the World Values Survey for the 27 
countries listed above and the measures of institutions taken from the Fraser Institute12and other 
sources.  
We are interested in four aggregate measures of the institutional setup; the size of government, a 
measure of the quality of the legal framework (measuring the protection of property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts), the freedom to trade internationally and the volume of regulations . We relate 
these measures to reported job satisfaction in Figure 2 below. Each of the four aggregate 
measures is numbered from zero to ten where ten denotes maximum freedom. Thus the higher 
the measure the smaller the size of the government, the better the protection of property rights, 
the better the quality of the judicial system, the greater the freedom to trade internationally and 
the less restrictive the regulatory framework.  
All four measures affect both resource allocation and the distribution of income to a varying 
extent. Of the four, the size of government may be an indication of resource allocation in the 
corporatist fashion, as is market regulation. The measure of the quality of the legal framework 
can clearly be taken to capture institutions that have to do with income diversion while 
impediments to free trade affect both resource allocation and the distribution of income.  
A clear positive relationship appears between the quality of the legal framework and job 
satisfaction, the paucity of regulation and job satisfaction, as well to a lesser extent between the 
size (that is smallness) of government and job satisfaction. In contrast, job satisfaction exhibits 
no clear relationship with the freedom to trade. The relationships between the variables are 
documented in Table 3 (as measured by estimated coefficients and the R-squared). Note that 
differences in the size of government explain 44% of the cross-country variation in the mean 
level of job satisfaction; differences in legal structure (i.e. protection of property rights) can 
                                                          
12
 See http://www.fraserinstitute.org/. 
explain even more or 68% of the variation; and differences in the volume of regulation of 
business explain 35% of the variation. In all three cases we have a positive relationship such that 
a smaller government, better legal structure and less restrictive business regulation may contribute 
to greater job satisfaction.  
Of the four measures, the regulation of business is the clearest measure of corporatist 
influences. The quality of the legal structure also has the flavor of measuring corporatism. Taken 
together, a small government, efficient legal structure and low levels of regulation are 
characteristic of capitalist economies, which according to Table 2 and Figure 2 are likely to 
promote job satisfaction. In an appendix we show the subcomponents of the four measures: the 
size of government, the legal structure, impediments to trade and the volume of regulation. 
Figure A1 shows the four subcomponents of the size of government: government consumption, 
government investment, the top marginal income tax rate and transfers and subsidies. We note a 
rather weak relationship in the case of the subcomponents of the size of government variable. 
Turning to the legal structure in Figure A2 in an appendix we find much stronger relationships. 
There is a clear upward sloping relationship between job satisfaction and a measure of the 
impartiality of courts; judiciary independence; a measure of the involvement of the military in 
politics and a measure of the protection of intellectual property rights.13 
Turning to impediments to international trade in Figure A3 we find a positive relationship between 
job satisfaction and a measure of capital controls (absence of) and also, although much weaker, 
between job satisfaction and the paucity of regulatory trade barriers. Finally, Figure A4 shows the 
relationship between job satisfaction and the subcomponents of the aggregate measure of 
regulation of business. A positive relationship is visible for all three subcomponents; the paucity of 
regulation of credit market, regulation of labor markets and regulation of businesses. 
                                                          
13
 The correlation between job satisfaction and the involvement of the military in politics is mainly due to the 
inclusion of Turkey which has both low job satisfaction and a high degree of involvement of the military in 
politics. 
We have also considered six additional variables that measure interference in resource 
allocation. The first three measure access to capital: market capitalization, the number of listed 
companies and the Milken Institute Capital Access Index.14 The fourth measures barriers to 
entrepreneurship. In addition, we use measures of corruption from the Fraser Institute15 and the 
number of lawyers per capita to measure neo-corporatist institutions. The scatter plots between 
each of these six variables and job satisfaction are shown in Figure 3. There is a clear positive 
relationship between job satisfaction, on the one hand, and the number of listed companies, 
market capitalization, access to capital (a higher rank implies less access explaining the negative 
slope of the relationship in the figure) and the Fraser Institute index of corruption (implying that 
job satisfaction goes together with less corruption) and a negative relationship between job 
satisfaction and barriers to entrepreneurship.  
In Table 3, which shows the statistical correlations, there appears to be a surprisingly large 
number of significant correlations between job satisfaction and various institutional measures. 
Job satisfaction is negatively related to various measures of business regulation (a positive 
coefficient implies that less regulation and greater job satisfaction go together) – time with 
bureaucracy, starting a new business, irregular payments (corruption) – as well as with some 
credit market regulations – regulation on credit extension and interest rate controls. Regulations 
on hiring and firing labor are negatively related to job satisfaction (a positive coefficient), as are 
barriers to entrepreneurship. The legal structure is very significant; job satisfaction is positively 
correlated with the impartiality of courts, judiciary independence and the (absence of) 
involvement of the military in politics and the protection of property rights, all with the expected 
sign. 
However, we did not find any relationship between job satisfaction and measures of self 
employment, social expenditures or tax revenues as a share of GDP. We omit these variables 
from Table 3. 
                                                          
14
 http://www.milkeninstitute.org/. The CAI measures the breadth, depth and vitality of capital markets.  
15
 This variable is derived primarily from the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 
               Figure 6. Job satisfaction and aggregate measures of institutions  
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           The institutions are measured on a scale from zero to ten where the number 10 denotes maximum  
     freedom. Source: Fraser Institute (http://www.fraserinstitute.org/). 
 
Figure 7. Job satisfaction and institutions continued 
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Table 3. Institutions and job satisfaction  
 
Least squares with heteroskedasticity consistent coefficient covariance.* A higher number denotes more economic 
freedom.  t-statistics written in bold letters indicate significance at the 5% level. # Dummy variable for Turkey 
included. Turkey has a very low level of job satisfaction, as shown in Table 1, which makes it a strong outlier in many 
of the regressions. 
 
 
Dependent variable: job satisfaction 
Constant term 
Independent 
variable 
 
Independent variable: Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio R2 Obs. 
Resource allocation       
 Size of government *# 7.0 28.5   0.13  2.4 0.44 27 
    Government consumption * 7.9 23.5 -0.09  1.2 0.09 27 
    Government investment * 7.3 53.2   0.04  1.6 0.08 25 
    Top marginal tax * 7.5 56.6 -0.01  0.1 0.00 25 
    Transfers and subsidies * 7.5 30.9  0.00  0.0 0.00 26 
 Regulation of business*# 6.0 17.2  0.21   4.4 0.38 26 
    Time with bureaucracy * 5.7 16.3  0.26   5.5 0.43 26 
    Starting a new business*# 6.9 25.4  0.12   2.9 0.47 26 
    Irregular payments * 6.5 28.2  0.15   5.0 0.54 26 
 Credit market regulations *# 6.1 13.5  0.19   3.2 0.21 27 
    Bank ownership*# 7.4 32.5  0.02   0.8 0.34 27 
    Bank competition*# 6.9 19.0  0.10   2.1 0.41 26 
    Credit extension*# 6.7 20.4  0.11   2.2 0.46 27 
    Int. rate controls*# 6.0 13.1  0.22   3.6 0.61 26 
Others       
    Barriers to entrep.ship  8.6 22.3 -0.45 2.6 0.30 24 
Income diversion       
 Legal structure* 4.7 13.4 0.34 7.8 0.68 27 
    Impartiality of courts* 6.0 20.2 0.20 5.5 0.40 27 
    Judiciary independence* 5.8 13.8 0.22 4.4 0.26 26 
    Military in politics* 4.9 19.9 0.29 10.2 0.63 27 
    Protection of property rights*# 6.1 21.0 0.22 4.8 0.48 25 
 Impediments to trade* 6.0 7.0 0.19 1.8 0.09 27 
    Tariffs* 7.7 9.0 -0.02 -0.2 0.00 27 
    Hidden import barrier* 6.8 12.3 0.09 1.4 0.07 26 
    Regulatory trade restrictions* 6.8 12.3  0.09  1.4 0.07 26 
    Actual versus expected size trade* 7.7 31.0 -0.05 -1.0 0.03 27 
    Capital controls * 6.0 16.1  0.19   4.3 0.44 27 
 Regulations * 5.6 13.7  0.29   4.6 0.35 26 
 Labor market regulations #* 7.0 29.5  0.12   2.7 0.43 26 
    Minimum wage*# 7.5 28.8  0.01   0.2 0.32 26 
    Hiring and firing restrictions*# 7.0 30.0  0.10   2.1 0.43 26 
    Collective bargaining*# 6.8 21.8  0.13    2.5 0.40 26 
    Unemployment insurance* 7.4 35.7  0.03   0.6 0.33 26 
 Milken index (rank) 7.9 62.7 -0.02   4.5 0.54 25 
 Number of listed companies 7.2 57.4  0.02   5.0 0.56 15 
 Market capitalization 7.4 54.8  0.36   2.4 0.27 15 
Neo-corporatist institutions       
  Number of lawyers 7.6 56.8 -12.75   0.2 0.00 26 
  Corruption  (Heritage Foundation)* 6.5 22.6  0.01   2.1 0.39 17 
The various impediments to trade – tariffs, hidden import barriers, regulatory trade 
restrictions and actual versus expected size of trade – do not appear to be much related to job 
satisfaction. However, capital controls are inversely related to job satisfaction. The extent of 
collective bargaining in the labor market – the narrow type of corporatism emphasized by labor 
economists – affects job satisfaction adversely, as do restrictions on hiring and firing. However, 
the level of the minimum wage, as well as the level of unemployment benefits, is not correlated 
with job satisfaction. The various measures of access to capital and the development of the 
capital market are highly significant: the greater the number of listed companies, the higher the 
market capitalization and the greater the access to capital, the higher reported job satisfaction is. 
Finally, corruption – both as measured by the Fraser Institute as “irregular payments” and by the 
Heritage Foundation as “freedom from corruption” – is negatively related to job satisfaction 
while the number of lawyers, when entered alone, is not significantly related to job satisfaction. 
We also need to explore whether our institutional variables may only be capturing the 
relationship between job satisfaction and income per capita since jobs may be more interesting in 
more advanced societies as the number of people with bad jobs decreases. For this reason, the 
effect of institutions in Table 3 may conceivably be exaggerated. However, we should note that in 
our thesis the institutions affect economic performance in a broad sense; output per capita, 
unemployment, labor force participation and job satisfaction. Thus finding that job satisfaction is 
only statistically related to income per capita and not at all to institutions would go against our 
thesis while a finding that job satisfaction is correlated with both income per capita and 
institutions would provide further support for the thesis. In order to control for this possibility 
we took data on GDP per capita16 for 1995 from the Penn-World table and re-estimated the 
coefficients in Table 2 by always including GDP per capita alongside each of the institutional 
variables. The inclusion of output per capita did not affect the sign or statistical significance of 
the large majority of institutional variables in the table, which tells us that the correlations 
                                                          
16
 PPP converted GDP per capita, 2005 international dollars per person. 
between job satisfaction and the institutional variables are not caused by institutions being 
correlated with output per capita and higher output being correlated with greater job 
satisfaction.17 Interestingly, when the number of lawyers per capita is included alongside real 
GDP per capita the coefficient of lawyers becomes negative and statistically significant from 
zero, implying that more lawyers and less job satisfaction go together. 
6. The data summarized 
The small sample size and the large number of potential explanatory variables for job satisfaction 
make multiple regressions difficult to implement. For this reason we calculate in this section 
principal components in order to summarize of the 27 (country) by 39 (variables) and relate them 
to our measure of job satisfaction. In Table 4 we first show the eigenvalues for a matrix that also 
includes our measures of economic performance: job satisfaction, productivity, and 
unemployment and labor force participation in addition to the 39 institutional variables. We then 
show the corresponding eigenvalues when we omit the four measures of economic performance 
and only include the institutional variables shown in Table 3 above in order to generate a set of 
principal components that capture the institutional setup. Finally, we omit the capital market 
measures – the Milken index, the number of listed companies and market capitalization – so as 
not to lose observations (countries). In each case the first two principal components explain 
around 1/3 of the variance in the matrices and the third one 8-15% of the variation. The 
corresponding eigenvectors are shown in an appendix. 
The first principal component for institution and performance combined corresponds to the 
first column in Table A1. The values of the eigenvector are positive for job satisfaction, 
productivity and participation and negative for unemployment. The positive value for job 
                                                          
17
 The following institutional variables retained their sign and statistical significance: regulation of businesses, 
time with bureaucracy, starting a new business, irregular payments, credit extension, interest rate controls, legal 
structure, impartiality of courts, judiciary independence, military in politics, protection of property rights, tariffs, 
capital controls, regulations, labor market regulations, hiring and firing restrictions, collective bargaining, the 
Milken index, market capitalization and the Heritage index of corruption. The following variables became less 
significant: size of government, credit market regulations and barriers to entrepreneurship. In contrast, the 
number of lawyers became statistically significant when controlling for output per capita, so that a higher 
number of lawyers is correlated with lower job satisfaction. 
satisfaction goes with a positive value for various institutional measures – indicating more 
economic freedom so that a positive value implies lower spending, taxes and so forth – for 
government investment, the top marginal income tax, regulation of businesses, time with 
bureaucracy, time required to start a business, irregular payments (bribes), the regulation of 
capital markets, bank ownership, competition between banks and interest rate controls. 
 
                 Table 4.  Eigenvalues for three data matrices 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulation of labor market, hiring- and firing restrictions (higher number implies less regulation), 
the legal system, the impartiality of courts, judicial independence, the protection of intellectual 
property rights, capital controls, the number of listed companies, market capitalization and the 
absence of corruption appear with a positive sign in the eigenvector and barriers to 
entrepreneurship and the country ranking in the Milken index of access to capital (indicating less 
access to capital) appear with a negative sign.  
Institutions and economic performance  
Number Value Prop. Cum.value Cum. prop. 
1 14.30 0.36 14.30 0.36 
2 12.07 0.30 26.37 0.66 
3 5.81 0.15 32.18 0.80 
4 2.53 0.06 34.71 0.87 
5 2.25 0.06 36.96 0.92 
6 1.52 0.04 38.49 0.96 
Institutions only     
Number Value Prop. Cum.value Cum. prop. 
1 13.11 0.36 13.11 0.36 
2 11.26 0.31 24.36 0.68 
3 4.01 0.11 28.37 0.79 
4 2.32 0.06 30.69 0.85 
5 1.91 0.05 32.60 0.91 
6 1.48 0.04 34.08 0.95 
Institutions reduced   
Number Value Prop. Cum.value Cum. prop. 
1 12.60 0.38 12.60 0.38 
2 8.23 0.25 20.83 0.63 
3 2.97 0.09 23.80 0.72 
4 2.65 0.08 26.45 0.80 
5 1.96 0.06 28.41 0.86 
6 1.01 0.03 29.42 0.89 
      
In Table A2 we have the eigenvector for the same matrix once the four measures of 
economic performance – job satisfaction, participation, unemployment and productivity – have 
been omitted and we get a similar pattern as in Table A1 for the institutional measures. Due to 
missing observations for the Milken index (25 observations) and the number of listed companies 
and market capitalization (15 observations) we finally omit these three variables and recalculate 
the principal components and report the results in Table A3. Again the pattern of the 
eigenvectors in Table A3 is similar.  
We can use the first principal component from the matrix of institutions (capital market 
excluded) as a proxy for corporatist institutions and plot it against our job satisfaction variable in 
Figure 8. A clear positive relationship appears so that greater corporatism goes with lower job 
satisfaction.                       
                     Figure 8.  Job satisfaction and an index of corporatist institutions 
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The most corporatist country by this measure is Poland, then Greece, followed by Italy, 
Japan, Hungary, France, Spain and Portugal. The least corporatist economies are those of the US, 
the UK, Ireland, Canada and Sweden. The ranking of Sweden may come as a surprise but note 
that the institutional variables reported in Table 3 are not confined to the labor market – the 
centralization of the labor market in Sweden takes place in an economy that is not as corporatist 
in other spheres as many other European countries. 
 
7. Behind the aggregates 
In the introductory chapter we noted a set of stylized facts from the study of job satisfaction 
using microeconomic data. There is some indication that job satisfaction has been falling over 
time in some countries; job satisfaction is higher among women, the self-employed, the young 
and the old, supervisors and those with secure jobs; it is smaller for union members and greater 
for the well paid workers. In this section we explore the robustness of our earlier results by 
correcting for differences between countries in the structure of their populations in light of the 
stylized facts. We use 47,418 observations from the World Values Survey, taken from the 1980-
1981 survey, the 1990-91 survey and the 1999-2000 survey. We regress reported job satisfaction 
on individual attributes and country dummies. The results are shown in Table 5.  
                   Table 5. Job satisfaction and individual attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                             t-statistics in parentheses. The variable sex takes the value 1 for men and 2 for women 
                            , the variable self-employed takes the value 0 if not self-employed and 1 if self-employment  
                             and similarly for union membership. 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Constant term 
6.93 
(59.9) 
6.51 
(64.0) 
6.93 
(59.0) 
Sex 
0.01 
(0.7) 
0.06 
(2.7) 
0.02 
(0.7) 
Age 
0.008 
(1.6) 
-0.002 
(0.4) 
0.01 
(1.6) 
Age-squared 
0.00013 
(2.3) 
0.0003 
(4.5) 
0.0001 
(2.3) 
Self-employed 
0.32 
(8.9) 
0.28 
(7.7) 
0.32 
(8.9) 
Income-deciles 
0.07 
(16.7) 
0.10 
(22.4) 
0.07 
(16.6) 
Union membership 
-0.11 
(4.4) 
0.07 
(2.9) 
-0.11 
(4.5) 
Time, 1990-91  
-0.06 
(2.2) 
0.03 
(0.9) 
Time, 1999-00  
-0.22 
(7.5) 
-0.05 
(1.5) 
Observations 37,810 37810 37810 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.07 
We first regress job satisfaction on worker characteristics and a set of country fixed effects and 
report the results in column (1). The signs of the estimated coefficients are mostly in line with the 
stylized facts; women and the self-employed have greater job satisfaction, union members have 
lower job satisfaction and higher income brings greater satisfaction. However, the U-shaped age 
pattern does not arise in these data. In column (2) we omit the country fixed effects and instead 
include time dummies for the two periods 1990-91 and 1999-00. The estimated coefficients do 
indicate declining job satisfaction over time. Finally, in column (3) we include both time dummies 
and country fixed effects. This makes the time dummies less significant but the point estimates 
continue to indicate declining job satisfaction. 
Figure 9 below shows the relationship between the job satisfaction variable used in previous 
sections of this paper (average of mean 1990-1991 and 1999-2000 values taken from the WWS) 
and the country fixed effects calculated by not correcting for individual characteristics, on the 
one hand, and the relationship between the unadjusted and adjusted (for individual 
characteristics) country-fixed effect, on the other hand. The left-hand panel shows that the 
estimated country-fixed effects are closely correlated with the average values for the two waves 
1990-91 and 1999-00 reported by WWS and used in the cross-sections in previous sections. The 
correlation is 0.97. There is also a close relationship in the right-hand panel between the 
unadjusted country-fixed effects and (1) of Table 5. The correlation between the two is 0.95.18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 The outlier in the bottom-left part of the charts is Turkey. 
 
    Figure 9. Job satisfaction and country fixed effects 
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We conclude that using mean values for job satisfaction is justifiable in the light of the finding 
that this would not be significantly altered once account is taken of various individual attributes. 
 
8. Conclusions  
Reported job satisfaction is correlated with observable measures of economic performance, such 
as productivity, labor market participation and unemployment across the OECD countries. Job 
satisfaction is therefore not only important for life satisfaction but also for economic output.  
Job satisfaction is statistically correlated with measures of capitalism and corporatism. Using 
the Heritage freedom indices, it is positively correlated with labor freedom, freedom from 
corruption and property rights and negatively correlated with the Milken rank index of access to 
capital (implying that greater access to capital gives greater job satisfaction). Institutions of 
corporatism, in contrast, tend to hamper job satisfaction. Job satisfaction is positively correlated 
with protection of property rights and negatively with the volume of regulation of credit, labor 
and businesses. Moreover, job satisfaction is negatively related to barriers to entrepreneurship 
and corruption and positively correlated with access to capital. The number of listed companies 
and market capitalization are positively correlated with job satisfaction. 
Overall, we conclude that many of the institutions we have labeled as corporatist may hamper 
economic performance and job satisfaction. Societies may have picked a set of institutions from 
the set of feasible institutions that fail to maximize economic performance. 
  
Figure A1. The size of government 
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           The institutions are measured on a scale from zero to ten where the number 10 denotes maximum  
     freedom. Source: Fraser Institute (http://www.fraserinstitute.org/). 
 
Figure A2. The legal structure 
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           The institutions are measured on a scale from zero to ten where the number 10 denotes maximum  
     freedom. Source: Fraser Institute (http://www.fraserinstitute.org/). 
Figure A3. Impediments to trade 
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           The institutions are measured on a scale from zero to ten where the number 10 denotes maximum  
     freedom. Source: Fraser Institute (http://www.fraserinstitute.org/). 
Figure A4. Regulation 
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           The institutions are measured on a scale from zero to ten where the number 10 denotes maximum  
     freedom. Source: Fraser Institute (http://www.fraserinstitute.org/). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1.  Eigenvectors for institutions and performance  
 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
Job satisfaction 0.14 0.07 -0.27 -0.02 
Unemployment (1995) -0.08 -0.08 0.34 -0.13 
Participation (1995) 0.16 0.09 -0.27 0.00 
 Productivity (1995) 0.16 0.03 -0.07 0.18 
 Size of government 0.02 0.26 0.07 0.18 
    Government consumption -0.08 0.19 0.18 0.29 
    Government investment 0.17 0.08 0.09 -0.24 
    Top marginal tax 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.17 
    Transfers and subsidies 0.08 0.24 0.06 0.14 
Regulation of businesses 0.15 0.23 0.01 0.01 
    Time with bureaucracy 0.22 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 
    Starting a new business* 0.23 0.07 0.17 -0.02 
    Irregular payments 0.23 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 
 Credit market regulations 0.22 0.00 0.20 0.07 
    Bank ownership 0.21 0.01 0.22 -0.11 
    Bank competition 0.15 -0.14 0.13 0.29 
    Credit extension 0.00 0.26 -0.04 0.10 
    Int. rate controls 0.16 -0.20 0.01 0.09 
 Labor market regulations 0.15 0.23 0.01 0.01 
    Hiring and firing* 0.23 0.10 -0.03 0.05 
Barriers to entrep.ship -0.22 0.06 -0.08 0.19 
 Legal structure 0.21 -0.06 -0.19 0.07 
    Impartiality of courts 0.24 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 
    Judiciary independence 0.21 -0.02 -0.18 -0.02 
    Military in politics 0.00 -0.10 -0.36 0.07 
    Protection of property rights 0.18 0.00 -0.19 0.24 
 Impediments to trade 0.09 -0.25 0.08 0.08 
    Tariffs -0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.46 
    Hidden import barrier 0.09 -0.25 0.08 0.08 
    Regulatory trade restrictions 0.09 -0.25 0.08 0.08 
    Actual versus expected size  
    of trade 0.09 -0.22 0.13 -0.05 
    Capital controls. 0.13 -0.21 -0.02 0.10 
    Minimum wage 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.02 
     Collective bargaining* 0.12 0.25 0.01 -0.04 
     Unemp. Insurance 0.09 0.26 0.01 0.07 
 Milken index (rank) -0.22 0.05 -0.11 0.02 
 Number of listed companies 0.15 0.05 0.03 -0.47 
 Market capitalization 0.18 -0.01 0.10 -0.05 
   Number of lawyers 0.10 0.03 0.33 0.17 
  Corruption  0.16 0.02 -0.31 0.03 
Table A2.  Eigenvectors for institutions 
 
 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
 Size of government 0.03 0.27 -0.05 0.18 
    Government consumption -0.07 0.20 -0.24 0.22 
    Government investment 0.18 0.10 -0.05 -0.27 
    Top marginal tax 0.19 0.12 -0.18 0.09 
    Transfers and subsidies 0.09 0.25 -0.02 0.16 
 Regulation of businesses 0.14 0.25 0.06 0.03 
    Time with bureaucracy 0.24 -0.08 0.05 0.06 
    Starting a new business* 0.24 0.10 -0.14 -0.03 
    Irregular payments 0.24 -0.10 0.13 -0.02 
 Credit market regulations 0.24 0.03 -0.18 0.05 
    Bank ownership 0.23 0.04 -0.20 -0.13 
    Bank competition 0.18 -0.12 -0.13 0.33 
    Credit extension 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.06 
    Int. rate controls 0.18 -0.19 -0.03 0.05 
 Labor market regulations 0.14 0.25 0.06 0.03 
    Hiring and firing* 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.07 
Barriers to entrep.ship -0.24 0.03 0.05 0.19 
 Legal structure 0.22 -0.05 0.25 0.11 
    Impartiality of courts 0.25 -0.10 0.09 0.00 
    Judiciary independence 0.21 -0.02 0.28 0.06 
    Military in politics -0.02 -0.12 0.36 0.03 
    Protection of property rights 0.17 0.00 0.24 0.25 
 Impediments to trade 0.10 -0.25 -0.12 0.05 
    Tariffs -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 0.48 
    Hidden import barrier 0.10 -0.25 -0.12 0.05 
    Regulatory trade restrictions 0.10 -0.25 -0.12 0.05 
    Actual versus expected size  
    of trade 0.12 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 
    Capital controls. 0.13 -0.21 0.06 0.16 
    Minimum wage 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.10 
     Collective bargaining* 0.10 0.25 0.06 -0.01 
     Unemp. insurance 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.08 
 Milken index (rank) -0.25 0.02 0.07 -0.02 
 Number of listed companies 0.16 0.07 0.03 -0.48 
 Market capitalization 0.19 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 
   Number of lawyers 0.12 0.06 -0.39 0.09 
 Absence of corruption (Fraser) 0.11 -0.01 0.38 0.06 
                    Table A3.  Eigenvectors for institutions – reduced sample  
 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 
 Size of government 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.19 
    Government consumption -0.10 0.21 0.29 0.06 
    Government investment 0.21 0.07 -0.07 0.14 
    Top marginal tax 0.09 0.16 0.33 0.21 
    Transfers and subsidies 0.07 0.28 -0.04 0.18 
  Regulation of businesses 0.13 0.30 -0.04 -0.10 
    Time with bureaucracy 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 
    Starting a new business* 0.20 0.17 0.20 -0.14 
    Irregular payments 0.26 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 
 Credit market regulations 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.22 
    Bank ownership 0.19 0.04 0.15 0.08 
    Bank competition 0.21 -0.07 0.22 0.10 
    Credit extension 0.14 0.12 -0.23 0.24 
    Int. rate controls 0.24 -0.11 -0.01 0.12 
 Labor market regulations 0.13 0.30 -0.04 -0.10 
    Hiring and firing* 0.09 0.20 0.15 -0.30 
Barriers to entrep.ship -0.24 -0.05 -0.16 0.07 
 Legal structure 0.26 0.00 -0.15 -0.09 
    Impartiality of courts 0.26 -0.01 0.01 -0.13 
    Judiciary independence 0.24 0.03 -0.20 -0.15 
    Military in politics 0.13 -0.06 -0.22 -0.25 
    Protection of property rights 0.22 -0.01 -0.16 0.20 
 Impediments to trade 0.17 -0.22 0.21 -0.05 
    Tariffs 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.41 
    Hidden import barrier 0.17 -0.22 0.21 -0.05 
    Regulatory trade restrictions 0.17 -0.22 0.21 -0.05 
    Actual versus expected size  
    of trade 0.16 -0.13 0.21 -0.27 
    Capital controls. 0.23 -0.08 -0.11 0.14 
    Minimum wage 0.01 0.28 0.05 -0.14 
     Collective bargaining* 0.10 0.29 -0.13 -0.05 
     Unemp. insurance -0.01 0.32 0.01 -0.05 
   Number of lawyers 0.05 0.09 0.34 0.34 
 Absence of corruption (Fraser) 0.14 -0.04 -0.33 0.11 
The data and their sources 
Heritage Foundation variables 
Fiscal freedom. 
Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It includes both the 
direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and the 
overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. 
Business 
freedom 
(red tape) 
Business freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a 
business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of 
government in the regulatory process. 
Labor freedom.  
The labor freedom component is a quantitative measure that looks into various aspects of 
the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labor market. It provides cross-country 
data on regulations concerning minimum wages; laws inhibiting layoffs; severance 
requirements; and measurable regulatory burdens on hiring, hours, and so on. 
Financial 
freedom.  
Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence 
from government control and interference in the financial sector. 
Investment 
freedom.  
The Index evaluates a variety of restrictions typically imposed on investment. Some countries 
restrict access to foreign exchange; some impose restrictions on payments, transfers, and 
capital transactions; in some, certain industries are closed to foreign investment. Moreover, 
labor regulations, corruption, red tape, weak infrastructure, and political and security 
conditions can also affect the freedom that investors have in a market.  
Freedom from 
corruption. 
Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into 
economic relationships. The score for this component is derived primarily from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2009, which measures 
the level of corruption in 180 countries. 
Trade freedom. 
Trade freedom is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that 
affect imports and exports of goods and services. 
Property rights. 
The property rights component is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the 
degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. 
Government 
spending. 
This component considers the level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
Government expenditures, including consumption and transfers, account for the entire 
score. 
  
Fraser Institute variables 
Size of 
government 
General government consumption spending 
 Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
 Government enterprises and investment 
 Top marginal tax rate 
 Top marginal income tax rate 
 Top marginal income and payroll tax rates 
Legal Structure 
and Security of 
Property Rights 
Judicial independence (GCR) 
 Impartial courts (GCR) 
 Protection of property rights 
 Military interference in rule of law and the political process 
 Integrity of the legal system 
 Legal enforcement of contracts 
 Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property 
Freedom to 
Trade 
Internationally 
Taxes on international trade 
 Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 Size of the trade sector relative to expected 
 Black-market exchange rates 
 International capital market controls 
Regulation of 
Credit, Labor, 
and Business 
Credit market regulations 
 
Ownership of banks, Foreign bank competition, Private sector credit, 
Interest rate controls/Negative real interest rates 
 Labor market regulations 
 
Minimum wage, Hiring and firing regulations, Centralized collective bargaining, 
Mandated cost of hiring, Mandated cost of worker dismissal, Conscription 
 Business Regulations 
 
Price controls, Administrative requirements, Bureaucracy costs, Starting a business, 
Extra payments/Bribes/Favoritism, Licencing restrictions, cost of compliance.  
 Other variables 
Public employment Share of public employment in total employment, 1995. ILO 
Public employment Share of public employment in total employment, 1999. OECD 
Taxes  Tax revenues as a proportion of GDP. OECD. 
Barriers to trade. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx OECD. 
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship. 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx OECD 
State control. http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx OECD 
Social expenditures. Social expenditures, share of GDP. OECD. 
Number of lawyers. Total number of members of the Bar. 
Conseil des Barreeaux 
Europeens, American 
Bar Association, 
Advocates 
International, 
Bloomberg, Wikipedia 
(Canada). 
Lobbying. 
Number of special interest groups; special interest organisations, 
chamber of commerce.  
World Guide to Trade 
Associations. 
Self employment 
http://www.photius.com/rankings/self_employment_by_oecd_
country_2008.html 
Labour Market Statistics, OECD database, August 2008;  Labour 
Force Statistics: 1986-2006, OECD, Paris, 2007;  "OECD 
Employment Outlook,OECD, Paris, 2008. " 
OECD 
Self employment Proportion reporting self employment.  World Values Survey. 
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